Lets talk on Talibanization

By now it is an established fact that the other party—the Taliban and their ilk—are extensions of this security arrangement by the military. So the matter of who is to talk to who is confusing

Whether or not the PML (N) government should talk to the Taliban has become a topic hotter than the piercing heat amidst the country’s power shortage. Both the PML (N) and the new country-wide political force, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf, have put this question on their agendas.

According to studies in conflict resolution, dialogue between combating parties is preferable to war. It is the only way to resolve a conflict peacefully. But it can only work well when the parties in conflict are known and their motives are clear and well defined. Once the nature and motives of the conflict are defined, negotiators or mediators come in and help the parties involved resolve the conflict. I knew an elderly man who was very successful in settling conflicts between groups and tribes. Once I asked what he used to bring the parties to peace. He replied, “By showing the tip of the dagger”.

By ‘tip of the dagger’ he meant the repercussions of the conflict. If either of the parties didn’t come to terms, the wise man would put before them the likely bleak future for them and for coming generations. If that did not work he would explain to the parties in turn how strong the other party is. This would frighten both and eventually they would come to a peaceful settlement because each would by then fear the strength of the other.

The option of dialogue with the Taliban is very fascinating. At the same time it has certain ambiguities and uncertainties.

First, the parties are not well spotted. True, one party is the Pakistani state. The question then arises what we really mean by a “Pakistan state”. Is it the government that has the power in Pakistan to make major decisions, especially regarding security concerns, or is it the military that has the power? Given the history of the Pakistani security narrative the latter wields the ultimate power. By now it is an established fact that the other party—the Taliban and their ilk—are extensions of this security arrangement by the military. So the matter of who is to talk to who is confusing.

Similarly the Taliban by now has become a franchise. There are factions here. Some are already at peace with the military while others are free and willing to blast, maim or kill whoever they want. It seems there are “good” and “bad” Taliban. The good Taliban are those who spare the Pakistani security forces but attack others in Afghanistan. The bad are those who attack Pakistani security forces and are unwilling to be controlled by the designers. Then there are jihadi outfits who by now have aligned themselves with the Taliban and consequently with al-Qaeda. The issue of how the Pakistani Taliban is isolated from the Afghan Taliban is also confusing.

Secondly, the motives of the parties are not clear. Is the objective a lasting peace or merely obtaining a level field for five years?  The PML (N), the party in power, seems to be overwhelmed by the Taliban’s trust in them in making them guarantors. Given the PML (N)’s soft spot for India and the USA one wonders why and how the Taliban, considered to be anti-India and the USA, have suggested Nawaz Sharif as a guarantor. May the other argument that Taliban are actually controlled by forces in Punjab not be true!

The cliché that the Taliban want Shari’a (Islamic Law) in Pakistan also needs close examination. This is still not known. What is known is that Sufi Muhammad made such a demand in the early 1990’s in MalakandDivision. If Sufi Muhammad’s demand is upheld by all of the Taliban and jihadi outfits he made it clear through his speech in Feb. 2009 when he denounced the country’s constitution and custodian institutions. Whether PML (N) brings another Shari’a Bill, or the PTI and JI coalition in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa pass the Hasba Bill lying in the assembly archives,  the Taliban will never be satisfied unless HakimullahMehsud  becomes Amir-u-Momenin. We witnessed this in Malakand Division in the form of NizamAdl.

There is another debate on the causes of the Taliban insurgency. Many, expressed perhaps most clearly by Imran Khan, hold that the Taliban kill innocent civilians and soldiers for revenge. Let’s suppose it is revenge for drone strikes in FATA. This incites the Taliban and their ilk to kill, ravage and destroy innocent people in centers of socialization, markets and mosques. How does it make sense that the killing of soldiers, dancers, drivers, Pirs, policemen and innocent people in K-P and FATA are just because someone ordered an operation on a certain Red Mosque in Islamabad? How is it justified that the bombing of schools, hospitals, bridges and police stations are actually fighting the USA, located thousands of miles away?

The idea of talking to the Taliban about peace is greatly alluring. But it is uncertain whether it will help Pakistan secure peace given the 10 previous peace accords with the Taliban.

The best time for a peace dialogue with Taliban was soon after the Swat offensive in the summer of 2009. Then, the Pakistani state had the tip of the dagger, when for the first time it showed its mettle against the Taliban insurgents.

It seems that a strategic policy for Afghanistan and India regarding discussions with the Taliban is capable of accomplishing nothing except to further entice the terror stricken masses of Pakistan. If the incoming government wants peace it must begin by talking about the larger security narrative which unfortunately allows for manipulation of religious extremism for strategic depth. A change in the security regime can bring lasting peace and only a strong Punjabi prime minister can do that.