Pakistan’s Afghan misadventure: Durand Line to Strategic Depth
Over the last the three years the Pakistan military has accused the Afghan army of shelling into Pakistan while the Afghan government protested against attacks by Pakistan’s border forces. It is hard to verify these claims. However, it is certain that Pak-Afghan relations, like Pak-India relations, have not been good since 1947 when Pakistan came into being (Emadi 1990). While Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s entry to the UN (Hasan 1962:16), both countries had border clashes, in 1949-50 and 1960-61, which at one time resulted in a complete severance of diplomatic relations. In the 1970s, tensions rose again, and in the 1980s, Pakistan became a base camp for anti-Afghanistan subversion. The rest is a catastrophic history in the making.
Durand Line and Pakhtoonistan:
In 1947, Kabul was not ready to accept the Durand Line, marked in 1893. The Line, which bifurcated Afghanistan and British India, arbitrarily divides Pashtoons. Justifiably, many Pashtoons regard it as an insult to Pashtoon nation(alism).
Opposing Pakistan’s UN membership, an Afghan representative at the UNO said, ‘This unhappy circumstance is due to the fact that we do not recognise the old North Western Frontier Province as part of Pakistan so long as the people of the North Western Frontier Province have not been given an opportunity free from any kind of influence to determine ...whether they wish to be independent or become a part of Pakistan (qtd in Chopra 1974: 311). Afghan Prime Minister, Muhammad Hashim, in an interview with the Statesman, was even more candid when he explained the Afghan viewpoint: ‘if an independent Pushtonistan cannot be set up, the frontier province should join Afghanistan. Our neighbour Pakistan will realise that our country, with its population and trade, needs an outlet to the sea, which is very essential (qtd. in Emadi 1990: 1515).
Ever since, there has been such Afghan belligerence regarding the Durand Line that Kabul, even under a pro-Pakistan Taliban regime, refused to acknowledge the Durand Line as an actually existing border (Rashid 2001: 254).
In response to Afghan claims, Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, defiantly stated that, ‘While the Government of Pakistan is willing to establish friendly relations with the Royal Government of Afghanistan, they cannot be expected forever to continue pleading for friendship, and while they have not given up hopes that sanity will dawn on the rulers of Afghanistan, they must reiterate in clear unambiguous language that not one inch of our land will be surrendered to anybody’ (qtd in Chopra 1974: 313).
In 1949, Pakistan resorted to aerial bombing of FATA in efforts to subdue tribal unrest led by Ipi Faqir. Parts of Afghanistan also came under attack. This provoked a strong Afghan reaction. For the first time, during 1949-50, border clashes between the two countries were reported (Hasan 1962: 16). However, tensions reached new heights in 1955 when Pakistan announced One Unit, whereby the provinces of West Pakistan were amalgamated into one administrative unit (basically to counter the numerical superiority of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh). The Pakistan embassy in Kabul and Pakistani consulates in Kandhar and Jalalabad were ransacked and both countries withdrew diplomatic staff (Chopra 1974: 315, Hasan 1962: 16, Emadi 1990: 1515).
As a result of reconciliatory efforts by certain Muslim countries, a thaw in relations led to high-level visits. In 1956, Pakistani President, Iskander Mirza, and Afghan Prime Minister Sardar Daud exchanged visits. In 1957, Pakistani Prime Minister, Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy, went to Afghanistan and in 1958, the Afghan king Zahir Shah, visited Pakistan. Following Zahir Shah’s trip, a transit agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan was signed (Hasan 1962:16).
Before long however, in 1960, bilateral relations plunged again. Apparently, the fresh crisis was spurred on by Pakistan’s action against the Pushton ruler of Dir state. Afghanistan force- landed two Pakistan Air Force aircrafts at its Kandhar base, alleging that they were violating Afghan airspace. In a strongly worded note, Kabul alleged that 30 such violations had occurred earlier. Pakistan regretted the incident and termed it an accidental violation of Afghan airspace. In the heat of the moment, Kabul announced it would divert the Kabul river, jeopardizing the Rs 60 million Warsak project. Before the dust could settle, Pakistan claimed that Afghan army, in the guise of irregulars, had attacked Pakistan’s tribal areas. According to claims made by Pakistan, the Mohmand tribe, in league with Charamangi and Sularzai tribes, repulsed the attack (Chopra 1974: 315-317).
In 1961, when the Afghan consulate in Quetta and Pakistan’s consulates in Jalalabad and Kandhar were attacked in a tit-for-tat response, Kabul severed diplomatic relations with Pakistan on the 6th of September (Chopra 1974: 318, Emadi 1990: 1515).
On one hand the severing of diplomatic ties led to a hectic effort by the USA to help revive the diplomatic link. In the Cold War context at the time Washington did not want Kabul to reach out to Moscow (Chopra 1974.) On the other hand, there was a split in Kabul’s elite. When Pakistan refused the transit route to Afghanistan, economic conditions began to deteriorate, precipitating an economic and political crisis. A faction around King Zahir, interested in reviving ties with Pakistan, triumphed and Sardar Daud resigned as Prime Minister after ten years [1953-63] (Emadi 1990: 1515). The Kennedy administration assigned the task of reviving AfPak ties to the Shah of Iran who visited both countries in 1962 while the resignation of Daud, considered a hard-core Pushton nationalist, further eased the job. Diplomatic ties were revived in 1963.
For the next ten years, until Sardar Daud, assisted in a coup by Afghan communists, staged a comeback, relations remained relatively calm. In 1965, Gen Ayub paid a visit to Kabul (Chopra 1974: 325), which helped maintained a status quo.
At the time when Sardar Daud ousted his cousin, King Zahir, Pakistan was also undergoing a crisis. The Bhutto government dismissed the NAP-government in Balochistan and the NAP-government in NWFP resigned in protest. The NAP leadership was jailed. As a result protests were invoked in Kabul. However, Daud’s nationalist credentials caused worry in Islamabad. While, on one hand, Bhutto welcomed anti-Daud exiles, including Gulbadin Hekmatyar and his actual teacher Gulbadin Hekmatyar, on the other hand, the Daud government blamed a tribal uprising in Panjsher in 1975 on Pakistan (Ali 1983: 130, Emadi 1990: 1516).
On staging a coup in 1973, Sardar Daud vowed to establish Greater Afghanistan, which included parts of Iran. As a result the Shah also viewed him with suspicion. During the Daud period there were border clashes between Iran and Afghanistan.
Another reason for Iranian/Pakistani distrust of Daud could be his proximity to Moscow. Although known as the Red Prince in Afghan left circles, Afghan communists butchered him. He was assassinated after Pak-Afghan-Iran relations normalised following hectic diplomatic efforts. Whether he was killed by the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) for ditching Moscow and approaching the west arose? Conspiracy theories abound in this regard.
However, when the PDPA came to power, it also vowed to establish a Greater Afghanistan from Oxus to Abasin/Pamir to Bolan and refused to acknowledge the Durand Line as an international border (Emadi 1990: 1516). Fast forward to 1990s onwards!
Durand Line to Strategic Depth:
Until early 1980s, while Pakistan’s Afghan policy was largely During Line-specific, it took a new turn by the end of 1980s. Hoping to establish Mujahideen’s regime post-Naguib government, Islamabad (in fact, the Pakistan military) began to view Afghanistan as a backyard it could exploit in many ways.
Of course, it is commonly believed that one aim was to maintain Afghanistan as a source of Strategic Depth in case of possible Indian invasion. Imperial-style grand khaki designs for Afghanistan also had in mind its strategic importance for post-USSR Central Asia. Likewise, safe havens could be provided for militants trained to wage/sustain ‘Jihad-e-Kashmir’.
Perhaps, all of this was not scripted well in advance. The Pakistan Army is hardly known for intelligent planning. However, it turned out to be so. Ironically, neither the Mujahideen regime, briefly headed by ISI’s blue-eyed boy Gulbadin, nor the Taliban were ready to submit to Pakistan on the question of Durand Line. Post 9/11, Pakistan lost the Afghan bet, in fact, ever since Afghan chickens returned home to roost. The rest, as mentioned above, is a catastrophic history in the making.
Concluding remarks:
Afghan ‘hostility’ to Pakistan/belligerence on the Durand Line, especially during 1947-1988 has been attributed to the machinations of India and Russia (see, for instance, Hasan 1962, Tahir-kheli 1974). Others ascribe Kabul’s Pakhtonistan policy, particularly under King Zahir’s and Sardar Daud’s command, to domestic reasons. Emadi (1990) for instance, says that while anti-Pakistan euphoria could help detain opposition activists as ‘Pakistani agents’, Pakhton nationalism could help rally support from Afghanistan’s Pushton belt and deny equal rights to non-Pushton ethnic groups. Also, initially in 1947, if one goes by mainstream accounts, Afghanistan perhaps believed that Pakistan would not survive and it staked its claims over the Pakhton belt in Pakistan in view of any future eventuality (see, for instance, Hasan 1962). That it was happening at the height of the Cold War further complicated the situation. For instance, in October 1954, Sardar Daud sent his brother Muhamamd Naeem to the USA seeking US military equipment. After two months, Washington told Kabul that US military aid would not be granted until Kabul solved the Pakhtonistan dispute with Pakistan. Enraged, Afghanistan held a Loya Jirga, attended by 1000 delegates, and it was decided here to approach Moscow for help conveying a strong anti-US message by announcing that all the US-funded development projects were terminated (Emadi 1990; 1515). Moscow was very happy to accommodate Kabul’s demands. Likewise, when Pakistan went tough on Afghanistan, Washington was worried that it would increase Afghan dependence on the USSR. The fact of the matter is: Afghanistan was never strong enough to dismember Pakistan. Even if Afghan demands regarding the Durand Line and Afghan support for ‘Pakhtonistan’ was a legitimate cause of concern for newly-independent Pakistan, subsequent aggressive Afghan policy, especially 1974 onwards, has been counter-productive.
Meddling in Afghan affairs 1979 onwards has contributed to immense hatred for Pakistan in Afghanistan (See, Baloch 2014).
It is imperative that Pakistan radically reviews its Afghan policy. Not only is total disengagement an absolutely necessary starter, an elastic approach towards the Durand Line will help ease tensions and help build confidence on both sides.
Bibliography:
Ali, Tariq (1983) Can Pakistan Survive. Penguin Books
Baloch, Hina (2014) Afghans and Pakistanis, friends turned foes? Daily dawn. Accessed on 14.7.2014: http://www.dawn.com/news/1083088
Chopra, Surrender (1974) Afghan Pakistan Relations- The Pakhtoonistan Issue. The Indian Journal of Political Science. Vol 35. No4
Emadi, Hafiullah (1990) Durand Line and Afghan-Pak relations. Economic and Political Weekly. Vol 25, No 28
Hasan, Khurshid (1962) Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Asian Suurvey. Vol 2, No7. Pp14-24
Rashid, Ahmed (2001) Taliban. Urdu edition. Lahore: Mashal
Tahir-Kheli, Shirin (1974) Pakhtoonistan and its international implications. World Affairs. Vol 133, No 3. Pp 233-245