Whose war is this?

Zbigniew Brzezinski: ‘What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?’

The Taliban are an American hand-fed group , which is fed, equipped, guided and supported by Saudi petro-dollars through Pakistan’s Second Division...Pakistan, since long, is not cutting its coat according to its cloth and has crossed the red line , the criterion of which is Iran’s security limits.

Jomhour i Islami (Iran) 16 Oct. 1995

In an essay titled ‘Whose war is this?’ (Viewpoint issue#69), Nayyer Khan has candidly falsified claims by media and ‘politicians like Imran Khan’ that by being involved in the “war on terror” (WOT), Pakistan is fighting a war solely on behalf of the United States’. He does not even agree with ‘moderate’ thinkers saying that ‘what began as a war for the USA, has now become Pakistan’s own war too’. There is no denying the fact when he claims: ‘Pakistan was always going to have to fight this war – on its own behalf’.

Roughly 20 thousand Pakistani youth joined Afghan jihad. By 1992, 20000 Kashmiri militants had been trained while by 1995, 10,000 militants of Pakistani origin had been trained by Pakistan military (Mir 2004: 7). The jihadi Frankenstein was essentially bound to haunt Pakistan sooner or later. The 9/11 provided the impetus. The bearded blow-back is a natural outcome of Khaki pursuit of strategic death in Afghanistan. Any disagreement with Nayyer Khan, on this point, would be delusional. Even if the USA pulls its troops out, the Taliban militias would not lay down arms and become Gandhi-disciples.

However, one finds it hard to agree when he claims: ‘The events of 9/11, which provoked the US invasion of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, proved to be the luckiest of breaks for Pakistan. The deep state of Pakistan having its own notions and narrow objectives may never appreciate this bliss to fully capitalise on it though…without invasion of US/NATO, the Taliban would not only still control Afghanistan, but would have by now extended their authority up to at least Peshawar’. In view of Arab spring, this is nothing but naturalization of an imperial occupation designed at empire building.

At this point, Nayyer Khan’s essay becomes an exaggerated apologia for imperialist invasion of Afghanistan. He thinks, ‘Whatever the blurred border line between Pakistan and Afghanistan exists presently is a result of US military operations in Afghanistan’. And in his bid to absolve US imperialism, he generously revises history. He dispels another ‘popular belief in Pakistan’ that ‘the Taliban movement was a creation of the US’. He thinks, ‘During Afghan War, the US was compelled to make use of whichever local allies it could find. But it is clearly illogical to claim that by taking advantage of whichever existing groups or structures it also assigns responsibility to the US for their very creation.’

His revisionist trajectory takes an absurd hyperbole when he claims: ‘The biggest myth of all is that Pakistan took part in the Afghan War of the 1980’s at the behest of the US…It was not before mid 1980 that the newly elected Reagan administration was eventually lured by Zia to jump into war... More correctly the US was roped in by a clever Zia’.

He concludes by a stern warning, ‘a premature withdrawal of US forces from the region will see the re-emergence of a Taliban state which seeks to expand its borders further and further into Pakistan’. Has the history really travelled down the roadmap sketched by Nayyer Khan? Perhaps not. Let us deconstruct these new-found myths.

Did Zia trick Washington?:

In May 1960 a US reconnaissance plane was shot down by a Soviet rocket near Sverdlosk, in the Urals, after penetrating 1,250 miles into Soviet territory. This U-2 spy plane had taken off from Incirlik, Turkey, to Badda Ber, Peshawar. Pakistan was not even privy to U-2 flights from or to Badda Ber, if one goes by certain explanation (Khalid 118-119).

Long before U-2 episode, Washington had adopted Pakistan to play a certain role in the region. In fact, the American interest in Pakistan grew after Korean War that stirred the US concerns about the spreading red threat. Foster Dulles, who assumed his responsibilities as secretary of state when Eisenhower became president, in May 1953, visited India and Pakistan. On his return to Washington, he told the National Security Council that he was ‘tremendously impressed by the martial and religious qualities of the Pakistanis’. On June 2, 3 he was euphoric while he testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee during a closed congressional hearing: ‘…those fellows are going to fight any communist invasion with their bare fist if they have to’ (Kux 2003: 26). Dulles’ friends, to fight any communist invasion, joined South East Asia Defence Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954. Next year, Pakistan joined the Baghdad pact [Renamed as Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)] woven by the USA though she remained an observer herself. The CENTO was a guard protecting the Gulf oil wells.

Besides being a security guard at oil wells, the US had written off Pakistan as a factor of any importance until the kaleidoscopic events of 1978-80, i.e. the revolution in Iran, the American hostages crisis, the seizure of the Holy Mosque at Mecca, the successive coups, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and finally, the Iran-Iraq war. It all added tremendous importance to Pakistan’s strategic and political value (Khalid 1987: 179-180).

In the early 1970s, the US championed the ‘twin-pillar’ policy – an offshoot of the Nixon Doctrine, relying on and supporting essentially Iran and Saudi Arabia to protect Western interests in the Gulf region. Operative since 1972, ‘twin-pillar’ policy was on its last legs in 1978. In the wake of above mentioned events, it changed to ‘four-pillar’ policy. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, in the south-east, Turkey along the northern tier, and Egypt on the Western flank. American Under Secretary of State James Buckley, on November 12, 1981, in a testimony before US Senate Foreign Relations Committee termed Pakistan ‘an essential anchor of the entire south-west Asian region’ (Lifschultz1981: 18).

In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, special envoys began to visit Islamabad to assure their support. The most notable ones included foreign minsters of Australia (Andrew Peacock) and China (Huang Hu) and President Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezezinski.  These dignitaries visited Durand Line too (Khalid 1987: 180). On Jan 21, 1980, President Carter in a television interview warned: We have confirmed our commitment to Pakistan of 1959. We are committed to consult Pakistan and to take whatever action is necessary to protect the security of Pakistan, involving military force if necessary’ (Ibid: 180). It was the Reagon victory that paved the way for $3.2 billion aid since Reagan Administration considered Red Threat greater than the nuclear proliferation (Ibid:181). Any doubts still left regarding Khaki tail wagging the stars-and-stripes dog were dispelled by Zbigniew Brzezinski in an interview with a French magazine back in the 1990s. The interview makes an interesting reading, hence presented below in its entirety:

Question: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs ["From the Shadows"], that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan 6 months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the national security adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a role in this affair. Is that correct?

Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.

Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked to provoke it?

B: It isn't quite that. We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.

Q: When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against a secret involvement of the United States in Afghanistan, people didn't believe them. However, there was a basis of truth. You don't regret anything today?

B: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter. We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.

Q: And neither do you regret having supported the Islamic fundamentalism, having given arms and advice to future terrorists?

B: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?

Q: Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has been said and repeated Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today.

B: Nonsense! It is said that the West had a global policy in regard to Islam. That is stupid. There isn't a global Islam. Look at Islam in a rational manner and without demagoguery or emotion. It is the leading religion of the world with 1.5 billion followers. But what is there in common among Saudi Arabian fundamentalism, moderate Morocco, Pakistan militarism, Egyptian pro-Western or Central Asian secularism? Nothing more than what unites the Christian countries (Ali 207-208).

Birth of Taliban:

There are some American conservatives suggesting that ‘the Arab and Islamic worlds are not products of Western colonialism and Imperialism (Palmer 2007: 235) thus tracing the problems of Islam to its own sacred texts. How ahistorical!

But let us restrict ourselves to Taliban here.

The Taliban were a symbiosis of ISI-CIA mating in the 1980s and the bill for post-natal care was footed by our Saudi friends. Also, the Taliban did not emerge in the aftermath of US disengagement in Afghanistan. Pakistan saddled Taliban in the 1990s when Gulbadin Hikmatyar---the horse ISI was betting on since 1970s---did not deliver Kabul to GHQ. Most members, if not all, on Taliban Shura, including Mullah Omar, had fought in the ranks of various Mujahid factions. Starting with Ahmed Rashid’s ‘Taliban’, host of literature has been written on the emergence of Taliban as well as US role. The details below have been reported, mostly, by Michael Griffin in his highly-recommended Reaping the Whirlwind:

Back in 1997, when Pakistan-sponsored Taliban's seizure of Kabul became a reality, a disinterested Washington welcomed Taliban's arrival at the helm of Afghanistan. To quote New York Times, the ‘State Department was touting the Taliban as the group that might finally bring stability’. A US diplomat, Jon Holtzman, was advised to visit Kabul. Trip was, however, cancelled after media kerfuffle about women rights. Still $125 million were granted in aid (largest foreign aid) to Taliban. The State Department maintained secret correspondence with Taliban regime. At the time, media were replete with rumours regarding US-backing for Taliban. Ironically, the Jamaat-i-Islami termed the Taliban victory a US-sponsored plot to divide Afghanistan along ethnic and linguistic lines. Jamaat has been sympathetic to Gulbadin who was a Mawdudi disciple. Understandably, in May 1996, Qazi Husain Ahmad spent ten days shuttling between Gulbadin and Ahmad Shah Masood in a last-ditch bid to stitch an alliance to fend off the Taliban. Meanwhile, Gulbadin's support for Saddam Hussein had annoyed the Saudis. Perhaps Jamaat had not noticed this change in the Saudi mood. To further illustrate the Jamaat's troubled relationship with the Taliban, it is relevant to mention then-interior minister Naseerullah Babar's remark that the Taliban conquest of Kabul was "only a change of guard" from the Jamaat-e-Islami to the Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam.

Nawaz Sharif was equally frustrated over the Taliban's victory. He termed Benazir Bhutto's Afghan policy a disaster which had ‘turned friends into enemies’. However, in a few months' time, after he became prime minister in early 1997, his government was quick to recognise the Taliban government. Later on, the Sharif-Taliban relationship transformed dramatically.

To escape the Kargil imbroglio, Nawaz Sharif met Bill Clinton on July 4, 1999. Only Nawaz Sharif can tell if Clinton had dictated anything to him on the Taliban or not. On July 6, however, Washington imposed curbs on the Taliban regime. The US sanctions got an extra bite when, in mid-August, the Nawaz Sharif government announced restrictions on the Transit Trade Agreement. In early October, Nawaz Sharif travelled to Dubai to brief the Gulf states on his plan to withdraw support for the Taliban and push for Osama bin Laden's extradition. According to the Reuters report, ‘Sharif said he insisted that the Taliban stop all activities in Pakistan, hand over Osama bin Laden, or ask him to leave Afghanistan, and shut down all training camps’.

In short, Washington might have been disinterested in Afghanistan but was definitely not ignorant!

Whose war is it really?

 

All the talk about woman liberation notwithstanding, the US invasion of Afghanistan was an imperial act of empire building. A day after 9/11, Condoleezza Rice was scheming to capitalize on Twin Tower sympathy. Hence, to reduce the Afghan invasion to pipelines would not offer a sufficient explanation either. ‘The military empire is designed to secure future access to wealth, not to generate it in the process of conquest (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005: 80). Empire building does not follow a stylized pattern whereby military costs and economic benefits go hand in hand. ‘[W]hat appears to be a military –economic disproportion in one period appears “balanced” in the following. For example, US Cold War military expenditures and interventions contributed to the downfall of Communist regimes, which led to windfall profits and the lucrative exploitation of mineral resources in ex-Communist countries’ (Ibid: 75). 

Imperialism always acts in its own interest! 

Hence, the occupation of Afghanistan is not our war. The progressive forces, therefore, should not connive or lend any support to help consolidate or justify the US occupation of Afghanistan. The USA has no right to stay in Afghanistan let alone drone Pakistan. It is the US military aggression and presence in the region that has further fuelled unrest and complicated the matters. The very Taliban that Washington is busy fighting-negotiating-droning-assimilating, were fathered by the USA itself. But this does in no way imply condoning mindless Taliban violence in the name of ‘Pashtoon resistance’ or ‘anti-imperialism.’

Despite US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Taliban will not lay down their arms. They have a globalist agenda and are part of an international Jihadist freemasonry. A US defeat will bolster the Taliban morale the way Soviet-withdrawal encouraged al-Qaida to globalise its activities. But none of these concerns legitimizes continuous US occupation.

In the first place, Washington is not averse to fundamentalism. On the contrary, the mother of all Muslim fundamentalism: the Saudi state, is protected, patronized and sustained by Uncle Sam. In Middle East, Washington’s oldest ally is not House of Zion but the House of Saud.

Most importantly, the nature of the regime headed by Hamid Karzai should suffice to dispel illusions entertained by liberal supporters of US occupation. To drive out Taliban, Washington unleashed Northern Alliance on Kabul. Headed by recently assassinated Burhan ud Din Rabbani, Northern Alliance is a conglomerate of brutal war lords wanted for war crimes. They are mostly the former Mujahideen. However, post-9/11 most of these Mujahideen trimmed their beards or clean-shaved altogether to placate Western public opinion. The other component in the Vichy regime installed in Kabul consists of Tehran-backed warlords. Meantime, Gulbadin’s son-in-law has also been assimilated by Karzai regime. Washington is ready to assimilate Taliban only if they agree to permanent US military basis.   Hence, the secret talks! Understandably, the liberal proponents of US occupation cringe with unease every time media begin to report ‘secret’ US-Taliban confabulations.

The USA aims to stablise its occupation and is ready to cut any deal with any party involved including Taliban. It, therefore, is not an ally in the war on Taliban. The war on Taliban is not a their war. It is our war.

Perhaps, a reckless pull out is not what progressives should demand at this juncture. The progressives must devise a convincing alternative. They, for instance, can demand a UN-mandated ‘surge’. Similarly, progressives should demand trial of war criminals in an International Tribunal while all the militias should be disarmed.

The war on Taliban is life and death question for the women, workers, peasants, progressives and religious minorities. It has to be fought by masses by themselves on many fronts: political, ideological, economic, cultural and so on. Most important task, in this battle, would be to de-privilege the hegemonic sway of jihadist ideology over the Pakistani society. The building of tribal Lashkars and their success (brilliantly documented by Farhat Taj in her recently published, Taliban and Anti-Taliban) offer one solution. Mass mobilizations ---the way Spaniards took to streets after Madrid bombings--- is another alternative. Are we ready for either?

Bibliography

Ali, Tariq (2002) Clash of Fundamentalisms. London: Verso

Griffin, Michael (2001) Reaping the Whirlwind. London: Pluto

Kux, Dennis (2003) The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 Disenchanted Allies. Karachi: Oxford University Press

Lifschultz, Lawrence (1981) Ring Around the Gulf’. Far Eastern Economic Review. 11.12.1981. p 18

Khalid, Zulfiqar (1987) Pakistan in the Pamir Knot. Lahore: Vanguard

Mir, Amir (2004) The True Face of Jehadis. Lahore: Mashal

Palmer, Michael A. (2007) The Last Crusade: Americanism and the Islamic Reformation. Washington D.C: Potomac Books

Petras, J and Veltmeyer, H (2005) Empire with Imperialism. London: Zed Books

Farooq Sulehria is working with Stockholm-based Weekly Internationalen (www.internationalen.se). Before joining Internationalen, he worked for one year,2006-07 at daily The News, Rawalpindi. Also, in Pakistan, he has worked with Lahore-based dailies, The Nation, The Frontier Post and Pakistan. He has MA in Mass Communication from Punjab University, Lahore. He also contributes for Znet and various left publications in Europe and Australia.