Talking to Taliban

Negotiations have a rule of thumb: negotiate from a position of power. Situation is such that our besieged civilian government and military troops beg Taliban protection in FATA. If such is the power configuration, outcome of any ‘peace negotiations’ is already evident

Here are my reasons:

1. Talking to Taliban is to legitimize the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This umbrella outfit does not represent anyone. It is a consequence of strategic-depth-gone-wrong. No doubt, it is a powerful, dangerous, and cancerous outgrowth. Sins of khaki fathers are now visiting innocent civilian children. However, mere the force of Taliban suicidal missions or their sway over Tribal Areas does not legitimize them. Legitimacy requires representation. Taliban represent neither Pakhtoons by virtue of their composition [many are Punjabis besides Central Asians and Arabs] or politically [both in FATA and Swat where Taliban have ruled, a majority not merely voted PPP and ANP but in most areas Pakhtoons have been fighting back by raising tribal Lashkars]. If anything, Taliban instead of representing Pakhtoons, have antagonized vast layers of them. It is not a coincident that Taliban have butchered over 1000 tribal Maliks.

2. Who will talk to whom? Apparently, it is either federal government or the provincial government that will speak with one of the forty-or-so factions. In the first place, we do not know if the one faction coming to negotiating table would comprise of Good Taliban or the so-called Bad Taliban. If there are Good Taliban, we do not need to speak to them. They are already an ‘asset’ strategically kept for the post-2014 victory over Kabul. If negotiations are meant to involve Bad Taliban, what will be the parameters? But before negotiations, we also need to define the Bad Taliban. Apparently, Bad Taliban consist of terrorists attacking our military troops. They are in the pay of CIA/RAW/Mossad [hope Bad Taliban, to the envy of Good Taliban, must be drawing huge salaries being in the pay of three master spy agencies]. One wonders why negotiate with Bad Taliban? Why not directly talk to USA/India/Israel? Also, why not go to UNO and other international forums to unmask the United States, India and Israel. Why not treat bad Taliban the way poor Baloch nationalists are being dealt with? [This in no way means this author supports Baloch repression.]In fact, if we deconstruct the discourse of peace talks with Taliban, it amounts only to further confusion being deliberately spread.

3. Peace negotiations need certain parameters and common grounds. What will be the common ground? Implementation of Sharia? US withdrawal from Afghanistan? Withdrawal of Pakistan support to the USA in Afghanistan? End to drone strikes? Suppose Taliban lay down arms and withdraw their writ over the tribal areas under their sway on the condition that Sharia should be promulgated. Now the question is: who will implement Sharia? For them the ‘infidel’ Pakistan government is not capable of implementing Sharia. Also, which areas will be covered by Sharia? Entire Pakistan or FATA? Again, we do not know if Kurrum Agency inhabited by ‘infidel’ Shia will be covered by Taliban-dictated Sharia or not. As far as an end to US occupation or drone strikes is concerned, Pakistan can not do much. For that, TTP has to fight out Uncle Sam in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan can decide its relations with the USA. Given the fact that Pak Army has been running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, Pakistan is not an ‘ally’ anymore.

4. Negotiations have a rule of thumb: negotiate from a position of power. Situation is such that our besieged civilian government and military troops beg Taliban protection in FATA. If such is the power configuration, outcome of any ‘peace negotiations’ is already evident.

5. Past record is not enviable. Every time ‘peace deals’ with Taliban/TTP translated into further territorial gains for the Taliban. Most importantly, every time women rights were heartlessly sacrificed by unscrupulous politicians willing to strike politically expedient deals for the sake of immediate gains.

What is to be done:

A new discourse is necessary. There are no good or bad Taliban. They are all the same: puritan terrorists. Peace deals have not worked in the past, will not work in future either. Taliban have to be defeated militarily, politically, and ideologically. However, to defeat them militarily, we can not expect Pakistan Army to act unless it changes it orientation. As long as Pakistan Army is fixated with Kashmir and continues to pursue the ‘strategic death’, it will need ‘strategic assets’. In the absence of a mass movement to defeat fundamentalism presently visible in Bangladesh, army will not change its course. Also, tribal Lashkars  and such formations will have to be built to defend against Taliban and to defeat them. Similarly, the ideological and political position held by Taliban should be exposed. They have already discredited themselves through their actions. Once enthusiastic middle class dreaming to defeat the USA through Taliban, is now confuse. But in the absence of alternative ideological discourses and political narratives, confusion will prevail. However, for time being we can conclude by saying that the kerfuffle about ‘peace negotiations’ with Taliban is just that,  mere kerfuffle aimed at spreading further confusion.

Riaz ul Hassan has been actively involved in Social Media studies since 2006. He has held diverse editorial positions in different literary magazines including Ravi and Patras. Currently studying in Sweden and plans to pursue his PhD in the field of Social Media. Riaz graduated from Government College Lahore and has worked at the same institute for about one year as lecturer. He has keen interest and involvement in arts, theater and Social Media studies.