The Art of Losing War is a counterterrorism treatise attributed to Chun Choo, a high-ranking Pakistani military general, geopolitical strategist and tactician. Chun Choo’s actual name is unknown and the writer’s choice of a pseudonym is owing to the threat involved in the war that he uses as the case study.
The text has four chapters, each of which is devoted to one aspect of defeatist warfare. The treatise is the definitive work on failed counterterrorism strategy and tactics. It is the most famous, the most influential and the only work on formulating strategies to lose wars.
Leaders as diverse as Barack Obama, Hamid Karzai, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Asif Ali Zardari, Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan have drawn inspiration from the work. And likewise, the work has drawn inspiration from them.
The War on Terror
Chun Choo uses the War on Terror in the AfPak region to construct his treatise. He believes that this war epitomises the archetypal defeatist approach to warfare.
The Art of Losing War states that war should be prolonged as much as possible to enhance economic losses. According to the treatise, one must avoid decisiveness and resolve because this can result in unwanted triumphs and possibly allow the enemy to lose the war.
Chun Choo stresses on the importance of procrastination in his treatise. The decision to postpone military operations is crucial since it allows the terrorists enough time to plot and plan your defeat. The writer believes that a defeatist counterterrorism strategy is not a strategy per se but mere refusal to take any substantial steps. Lack of planning, decision-making and cojones automatically synthesises the flawless stratagem to lose any war.
The Four Chapters
The Art of Losing War is divided into four chapters, which collectively form the four Cs of a catastrophic counterterrorism strategy. Each C denotes one aspect and when all of them are applied in unison, according to the author, failure in war is guaranteed.
Confusion
The first C in the treatise is Confusion. Chun Choo believes that if you create confusion in the state regarding the enemy, you are almost certain to make it a one-sided war, where the enemy attacks and you don’t have to bother replying. Again, the writer quotes the example of Pakistani intelligentsia and how they created confusion regarding the Taliban during the War on Terror.
“Sometimes they painted the Taliban as patriots, sometimes as RAW agents. Sometimes the Taliban were working with the Americans and sometimes they were killing them. Al-Qaeda was a myth and so was Osama Bin Laden; but their achievements were celebrated as well. There were many who suggested that the Taliban don’t exist at all. How do you fight an enemy when it doesn’t even exist?”
Confusing the state about who the enemy is and who its allies are can help you delay the expected retort. However, creating doubt over the existence of the enemy is a strategic masterstroke that can ensure that you won’t have to reply to the enemy’s manoeuvre at all.
The second aspect of confusion highlighted in the treatise is regarding ownership of war. Chun Choo reiterates that you won’t have to fight a war if you convince everyone that it’s not your war in the first place.
“Over 50,000 Pakistanis were killed by the Taliban but the Pakistani leadership refused to take ownership of the war. They continued to clamour that it was the US’s war and hence there wasn’t any need to fight the enemy that was relentlessly killing the citizens. Every attack was blamed on US drone strikes, which was the only manoeuvre countering the Taliban. There were also regular utterances of ‘the US created the Taliban’, as if who created the monster is a relevant question when it’s on the verge of inhaling you alive.”
Confuse the masses and one fourth of your war is lost, believes Chun Choo.
Connivance
The second C in the treatise is Connivance. Chun Choo says sometimes ignoring the enemy’s attacks isn’t enough and it might eventually lead to a halt in the enemy’s aggression. Conniving with the enemy as it fights against you goes a long way in ensuring your defeat.
“PTI was the political wing of the TTP, with the PML-N also providing due support. It was the ostensibly anti-Taliban PPP that struck a peace agreement with TTP’s allied group the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) after defeating them in Swat. In fact it was PPP itself – Benazir Bhutto and her interior minister Naseerullah Babar – that helped create the Taliban. Even the most vociferous opponent of the Taliban, the ANP, agreed to the Taliban’s demands in Amankot where political candidates from PPP, JI, PML-N, ANP and PTI agreed that the women from the village would not cast votes in 2013’s elections. The conniving and compliance was straight from the top drawer.”
Taliban’s blood brothers the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) – later Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) – were included in the connivance as well.
“Azam Tariq got elected to the parliament four times from Jhang, managing to win the National Assembly constituency in 1990, 1993 and in 2002 – the latter while contesting election from jail. The Sharif brothers and Rana Sanaullah had a political alliance with ASWJ eying success in areas like Bhakkar, Jhang in the lead up to the 2013 elections. PML-N also led public rallies with Ahmed Ludhyanvi in Jhang and issued tickets to the likes of Abid Raza Gujjar in the 2013 general elections. No matter who was at the helm of the government SSP had its place in the parliament.”
Chun Choo believes that when a state’s own military connives with the enemy, you basically have the game wrapped up. And in the War of Terror, writes Chun Choo, Pakistan Army had helped create the enemy it was refusing to fight against.
“The Army and the Taliban go back many a year and have collaborated on many a front. From jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir to collaborations with the MMA, the Army-Mullah alliance was pivotal in fueling the Taliban. I mean when the GHQ is occupied and Ilyas Kashmiri is flown in to negotiate, you can understand what I’m talking about here. When your own defenders are the creators and coworkers of your enemy, that’s basically game, set and match isn’t it?”
Connive with the enemy, and that’s another quarter of a war that you’ve gifted the enemy, writes Chun Choo.
Cowardice and Capitulation
The third and fourth Cs in the treatise are Cowardice and Capitulation respectively. The final two chapters are presented almost as one, considering the correlation.
Chun Choo says that both Confusion and Connivance can be shrouded for a considerable span of time, but eventually a time would come when you’ll have to show some action to keep the ulterior motives hidden from the masses. That’s where Cowardice comes into the picture.
“The Taliban were mercilessly massacring the people, while leaders like Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif clamoured for negotiations. Negotiations with the Taliban basically meant caving in to their demands, because nothing that they put on the table was negotiable. The media as well spent years portraying the Taliban as freedom fighters and only woke up and smelled the coffee when the journalists themselves were on the hit-list.”
Chun Choo believes fearing the enemy and transferring the fear in the mainstream narrative can go a long way in ensuring that the enemy has a permanent upper-hand. This might result in some questions being floated, and tangible mass dissent, but anything’s better than winning a war.
Once cowardice becomes ubiquitous, it’s time to capitulate.
“The Pakistani leadership knew that it couldn’t give the masses the lollipop of ‘talks’ to suck on forever, eventually the time would come to surrender. 2014 proved to be that year, with the Americans leaving the region and taking with them every single trace of counter-Taliban intent. The TTP kept on bombing the people, and Nawaz Sharif kept on talking about negotiations. And eventually, with an unprecedented surge in bombings, killings and mass destruction, the Taliban took over Pakistan.”
The more cowardice you manifest, the easier it is to capitulate, writes Chun Choo.
Epilogue
The Art of Losing War is a comprehensive study on how to lose a war and Pakistan’s approach in the War on Terror is a classic example of successfully losing a war. Chun Choo calls it the nadir of defeatism, and the most impeccable approach to self-destruction. And with 200 million people being involved, he dubs it the greatest mass surrender in the history of the world.
