By Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal

Kashmir politics has moved a long way from Gushtaba dinner diplomacies to tea politics.

But if Kashmir dispute could be solved just over cups of tea, the over five and a half decades nightmare would have been over on January 22 itself when two sets of strangers warmed up over cups of tea and photo sessions with a promise of breaking the cold spell of the unending Chillai Kalan in the Valley, when All Party Hurriet (Ansari faction) Conference delegation met the deputy prime minister Lal Kishen Advani and later the prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

Advani's invitation to Hurriet earlier this month, following the SAARC summit and the resumption of air, road and rail links between India and Pakistan, had come as a whiff of fresh breeze.

But when it ended with a 'joint statement' or 'agreed synopsis', it was clear that the entire affair going down in the annals of history as an event was just a case of much ado about nothing.

Much like the previous attempts at initiating a dialogue on Kashmir, the hype got the better of substance as Advani assured to media persons just days before the talks.

That the 'mega-event' was a step ahead of the KC Pant, Ram Jethmalani and NN Vohra missions, there may be no doubt about that.

Firstly, it was an invitation straight from the deputy prime minister, also holding the Home portfolio, who obviously stands on a higher pedestal than the other interlocutors.

The latter were seen as people not authorised to initiate a dialogue .

Secondly, it was a direct invitation in the first place, unlike in previous cases where no formal invitations were ever doled out to separatists.

Thirdly, the talks on January 22 also paved way for a meeting with none other than the prime minister himself.

However, there is much more than meets the eye.

The bonhomie between Advani and the five member delegation of the Ansari faction of Hurriet, christened by the media as the moderate Hurriet (the other faction led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani dubbed as extremists), on January 22 was too smooth and cordial to seem real.

The manner in which a statement was prepared and readily agreed upon within no time at all aroused suspicions about whether the entire event was stage managed and pre-meditated.

When the issue of release of political prisoners was projected as a serene picture of cordiality between the two sides and was sold as a major breakthrough, eyebrows were being raised in Jammu and Kashmir, specially in the Valley, about the utility and purpose of the entire show.

The unusual smoothness of the affair may not be the only reason for skepticism.

There were many other reasons as well.

Number one: There was no invitation to the other faction of Hurriet, any other separatist individual or organisation.

Interestingly, ever since the split of the Hurriet some months back, the two sides that have been patented by media as moderate Hurriet and extremist Hurriet was being seen by the people as pro-India and pro-Pakistan.

There was a general perception that agencies on both sides had a role to play in splitting the 22 party conglomerate of separatist leaders which at one time was seen as a force to reckon within the Valley, if not rest of Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir.

Surprisingly, neither JKLF which has maintained equi-distance from both factions of Hurriet nor Shabir Shah, who at one time had found himself on the right side of New Delhi for talks, received the invitation.

Only the Ansari Hurriet deserved the honours.

The fact that Hurriet was a dreaded word for New Delhi before the break-up lends more credence to the belief that New Delhi and Islamabad were working midnight to create rift among the separatists with the Ansari faction obviously showing a greater tilt to New Delhi.

That the Geelani Hurriet was unable to receive a similar patronage from Pakistan, probably owing to Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf's own domestic compulsions of reigning in fundamentalist organisations, is another part of the story.

The delegation of Hurriet leaders included Fazal Haq Quereshi who made a mysterious and surprise come-back into limelight after the Hizb-ul Mujahideen ceasefire in 2001 when he was touted to play a crucial role as the intermediary in the talks that fizzled out.

The delegation also included Bilal Lone.

Not to forget that the Lone brothers have been discredited in the Valley's separatist camp for fielding not just proxy candidates in 2002 assembly elections but also there have been speculations rife in the state about their joining the mainstream politics.

More importantly, the much hyped bonhomie simply ended on the symphony of political prisoners or paving way for Hurriet leaders to visit Pakistan, making the entire affair turn into a story of much ado about nothing.

It was clearly a diversion from the basic stand and issue of the Hurriet of deciding the future of Kashmir.

These figured nowhere in the joint statement released by the Hurriet leaders and Advani.

The only thing the joint statement pivoted around were conducive steps for a solution.

Except these were now being projected and offered on a silver platter as the solution to Kashmir dispute.

Obviously, the main issue had become the casualty of the much publicised talks.

Ironically, the issue of release of political prisoners was already something that the state government had agreed on principle, even though the process of release is slow and selective.

Yet another reason for skepticism stems from the basic purpose of the sudden bid for friendship not just between India and Pakistan but also between New Delhi and the Kashmiri separatists, who till six months ago were being shunned as the 'untouchable terrorists'.

There have been indications that US pressure had been instrumental in setting the tone of friendship in South Asia.

As far as BJP, the ruling party in India, is concerned, it was probably trying to kill two birds with one stone.

While the US pressure may have been one factor, another happens to be the forthcoming Lok Sabha elections.

The BJP is looking forward to reverse its 1999 election strategy of Pakistan bashing in the wake of Kargil war to peace and dialogue in the season of peace initiatives and confidence building measures.

How far would these peace moves proceed if 'peace' itself is not the basic or original motivation and purpose? The January 22 meeting was self-explanatory.

One cannot miss the irony of the Hurriet's dilution of stand with the dispute and human rights violation agenda substituted by accolades of praises showered by its leaders on Advani who was suddenly labelled a 'moderate' and Vajpayee for the 'beginning made by him in Pakistan'.

Two days later, Hurriet (A) chairman Moulvi Abbas Hussain Ansari stated that New Delhi had recognised Kashmir as a dispute and had agreed to talks at a higher level.

He maintained that the meeting was significant since the peoples' representatives had been recognised for the first time in New Delhi and described discussions as fruitful.

Since the discussions were only closed door one has to go only by the word from both sides to the media.

The very first set of reactions demonstrated the different planks on how both parties were viewing the cordial bonhomie.

While Prof Abdul Ghani Bhat, who read out the statement after the meeting, preferred to call it a 'joint statement', Advani deliberately chose to describe it as 'agreed synopsis', conscious of the parity the word 'joint' may bring.

While the Hurriet leaders later tried to sell the ' internal ceasefire' theory in the days that followed, Advani on a visit to Jammu and Kashmir quelled all such speculations.

Mirwaiz Umar Farooq said he was hopeful of some confidence building measures by February 2.

But the deputy prime minister is still non-committal.

It is then no small wonder that the Hurriet (G) which raised a banner of protest in the Valley on the day following the 'historic event' blamed the Ansari faction of helping the designs of New Delhi.

Its leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani said that New Delhi has not recognised Kashmir as dispute but has asked those engaged in talks to help in quelling the violence.

For many separatists outside the Hurriet (A) it has been a complete sell-out.

The talks are being viewed as an important event in bringing normalcy and peace in the Valley.

How many would buy the theory sold by the Hurriet (A) inside the Valley and by the BJP outside it is for anyone to guess? The common ground that absolute strangers - the BJP and the Hurriet - found in New Delhi may go down in history as an important event indeed.

It may have broken the ice but would the frozen turbulence of several decades end with this bonhomie that probably was intended for a photo finish piece of historic event? UN: agent of western Imperialism