Musharraf and problem of succession

A contrived system would always remain vulnerable to the departure of the man who has manufactured it By Ejaz Haider Why do some of us insist on a civilian, democratic government, the regular kind that is, not the 'true democracy' General Pervez Musharraf is so fond of mouthing and which, presumably, he has put in place? This would be a fair question, for instance, for Musharraf to throw at those of us who remain sceptical of the longevity and sustainability of his contrived system.

It's only right that the position supportive of democracy be defended.

Let us leave aside other facets of the problem and look at it only in relation to the problem of succession.

What kind of system can ensure peaceful, legally acceptable political transition? Historically, the issue of succession has stood out as one of the most nettlesome problems, and governments and dynasties have risen or fallen on its basis.

If it is acknowledged that a principle of succession accepted by all contending actors is important for the continuation of a system and ensures the political, social and economic stability of a country, then it can be safely argued that its absence could lead to uncertainty and, in the event of a transition, result in instability.

Here's a specific example.

Last December, someone tried to kill Musharraf twice in the span of less than two weeks.

Mercifully, the attempts failed.

What if any one of them had succeeded? This is an important question and, not surprisingly, every commentator raised it in the wake of the two abortive attempts.

Why? Has Musharraf been unable to put in place a system stable enough to withstand the shock of his removal despite being in the driver's seat for more than four years and trying to make it failsafe? Could it be that a contrived system would always remain vulnerable to the departure of the man who manufactured it? Worse, is it possible that the flaw inherent in a system begotten of extra-constitutional power-grab would always keep it fragile? Perhaps Musharraf needs to chew on these questions.

The killing of a head of government or state is always a tragic event; governments do everything possible to ensure the safety of top leaders.

Even so, it can happen; indeed, has often happened.

How do countries survive such events? Those that have evolved systems where contending actors agree on the principle of succession do not breakout into extra-constitutional power struggles or, at an extreme, civil war.

The rules of transition are laid down in the constitution and the government continues to function despite the shock.

But if a state x does not have such rules, or if the acceptance of such rules is not across the board, the death of the head of state is likely to result in a power vacuum.

That space could be utilised by forces that want to change the existing set-up by making a bid for power.

Since any such attempt would be extra-legal, the ensuing struggle is not likely to unfold along legal-constitutional lines.

Either the new forces would manage to create a new system or the state would witness a struggle between two contending ideas.

Both scenarios would result in chaos and instability, most likely attended by violence.

When General Ziaul Haq's plane crashed, Pakistan transitioned to a quasi-democratic interregnum.

The one surviving officer in the top brass, then-Vice Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, consented to the transition as laid down in the constitution.

He could have easily gone the other way and taken over.

For some reason, he did not do that.

But the issue is larger than the question of why he did not make a bid for the presidency: it relates to uncertainty and the fact that, at least for a few hours, the fate of the country hung in the balance waiting for the decision of one person.

This is symptomatic of a sick body politic and throws a modern state back to the Aristotelian logic of tragedy where the fall of a society or state is sometimes linked to the fall of a hero of high stature.

Clearly, in this age, the intertwining of an individual's fate with a state's fortunes is not an acceptable framework and points, at a minimum, to the absence of a viable system.

And a viable system can be defined as one that works on the basis of institutions created through a constitutional mechanism and procedures rather than relying on the life and death and pleasure and displeasure of an individual.

Musharraf may want to do much good but he is sitting atop a high-rise without foundations.

He must constantly manoeuvre to keep people and events under control.

But he lacks knowledge of what might lie in the future.

His freedom of choice to act in the absence of that knowledge can play havoc with his system if he is removed from the scene.

He needs to answer the question of what might happen if he is gone.

Will Pakistan see a transition to democracy; if yes, what kind of democracy would that be under the circumstances? Or would the country see a takeover by a clique of generals, some of whom might want to reverse his good policies; worse still, could we see the forces trying to capture power pitted against those who might want to continue with Musharraf's good policies? Questions abound.

The scenarios do not make happy reading.

There is a possibility that the country does not come to any harm.

But states cannot operate on the basis of a feeble possibility of survival in the face of strong indicators of upheaval.

At the heart of this lies the non-existence of the basic rules of the game.

Can anything be done? Yes.

But for that, Musharraf needs to first understand that what he has stitched is unnatural and inherently unstable.

He needs to appreciate that democracy's strongest point is its ability to take shocks by operating on the basis of a principle of succession; that extra-constitutional measures, even when taken with noble intentions, create structural anomalies.

In essence, he must set down to remove the impurities he has put into the system and establish the principle that political power can only be secured through legal-constitutional means.

But such a system can be put in place only if he recognises the presence of all political players and accepts their legitimacy.

Besides, such an approach would require of him to accept the unconstitutionality of military takeovers.

_Courtesy : The Friday times