The Indo-Pakistan joint statement issued on the last day of the 12th SAARC Summit Conference in Islamabad was the most positive outcome of the much-delayed South Asian regional conclave.
It set aside the stalemate that has marred Pakistan-India relations since 2001, opting for dialogue on the contentious bilateral issues.
The Government of Pakistan cannot pursue the dialogue effectively without building domestic support.
This calls for focusing on different elements of the Pakistani polity and their possible reaction to the recently-announced strategy for dealing with India.
Traditionally, the military is viewed as being hard-line towards India at the operational level.
However, the noteworthy feature of the present context is that the military, especially the army, has changed its disposition vis-…-vis India.
The senior command has made up its mind to pursue dialogue on contentious issues.
The economic imperatives seem to have played a key role in changing the military's disposition.
It is generally believed that Pakistan has better prospects of putting its economic house in order and coping with the problem of poverty and underdevelopment, if India-Pakistan relations improve; Pakistan is also expected to attract more foreign investment.
Furthermore, almost all friendly countries have advised Pakistan to pursue negotiations with India.
The new strategy fits in well with the transformed global situation.
There is need for 'dialogue' within the military, explaining the new policy to the officers and the soldiers.
The senior officers can explain the major reasons for the change, emphasising that the new policy represents a change in methods rather than goals.
Such an exercise is needed at the middle and lower levels in the military to dispel misperceptions that are likely to be created by the ultra-nationalist statements of the Islamic parties and conservative political elements in society.
For a long time the Pakistani state promoted Islamic orthodoxy and Islamic militancy against the backdrop of the Iranian Revolution (February 1979), the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (December 1979), and the search for legitimacy by the military government of General Ziaul Haq.
This created a mindset that eulogises public display of religiousness and armed struggle in Afghanistan, Kashmir and other conflicts involving the Muslims.
The availability of state patronage for Islamic orthodoxy and militancy encouraged new groups to join the Kashmir insurgency, reinforcing the Islamic-orthodox and militant mindset in Pakistan.
This triggered religious and cultural intolerance in Pakistan and some of the militant Islamic groups used violence against those who did not share their religio-political perspectives.
The dialogue process will face the strongest opposition from these militant Islamic groups and their sympathisers, especially the groups directly involved in the insurgency in Kashmir.
Their opposition is understandable because if the dialogue proceeds, they go out of business.
In the past, some of them enjoyed the support of the state agencies.
They will view any change in this relationship as a betrayal.
Some of them have already vowed to continue with the Kashmir struggle.
Most Islamic parties, especially the MMA, are cautiously critical of the dialogue option.
They are not convinced that India wants to settle outstanding disputes, especially Kashmir, with Pakistan, and view the dialogue as an Indian ploy to deflect international pressure for talks with Pakistan.
Some of them have viewed the initiation of dialogue as an attempt by the West and India to force Pakistan to accept the status quo in Kashmir.
Some of them have taken exception to President Pervez Musharraf's willingness to shift from the traditional Pakistani position on Kashmir.
Fortunately for the government, the MMA is in power in two provinces and wants to stay in the power game.
This dilutes their zeal for agitation on this issue.
However, the MMA leadership and other Islamic parties would continue to criticise the dialogue process, sustaining negative public opinion in the country.
Some of the mainstream political parties have also criticised the government's decision to initiate a dialogue with India.
Their opposition is based on the dynamics of their relations with the government; as their relations are strained with the government, they will criticise the dialogue policy, as they do other policies.
The PPP is not opposed to the dialogue with India, although it has criticised some specific policy measures.
PML-N leaders have expressed divergent views on the policy.
Some have described this as a setback to the Kashmir cause.
Others interpret this as a return to the policy adopted by the PML-N government in February 1999.
Still others think that their party had done a better job because Pakistan did not accept any Indian condition for initiating dialogue in February1999.
On aggregate, the mainstream political parties are not going to oppose the principle of dialogue with India, although they may differ on the details.
They will monitor the dialogue carefully and express their views as the process progresses or stalls.
However, the government is expected to face strong opposition from militant Islamic groups.
They can retaliate by engaging in violence in Pakistan.
They can resort to violence in Indian-administered Kashmir or mainland India to derail the dialogue process.
In order to restrain the militant Islamic groups, the government should engage in a long drawn-out dialogue, making them understand the changed international and regional contexts.
This is a difficult task but an attempt must be made to bring them back into the mainstream political and diplomatic process.
Some of them will accept the new reality.
The militant Islamic groups will not be able to obtain the wholehearted support of other Islamic parties.
The latter will pursue a cautious and restrained opposition to the dialogue with India for the reasons discussed above.
Other political parties may express reservations about the prospects of settling the Kashmir problem through a bilateral dialogue or criticise Pakistan's handling of the dialogue, but these are not expected to make the dialogue a major issue of contention with the government.
The government should adopt measures to muster and expand the public support for the dialogue.
This is possible through constant engagement with political forces inside and outside the parliament on all aspects of dialogue with India.
The government should hold briefings on Pakistan's relations with India for political leaders, the academia and media, addressing their concerns about the dialogue.
The parliamentarians should be encouraged to go to their constituencies and explain the new policy to the voters.
The media--print and electronic--can play a vital role in mobilising support for changing the mindset of a strident approach towards India, building support for the dialogue.
The government needs to closely interact with the state-owned and private sector media.
The government should pursue interactive and participatory methods of political engagement in the domestic context for bringing more and more people and groups on board for the dialogue.
*(Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst).
