Bhutto-Army collaboration

Gen. Yahiya Khan along with some senior military generals visited Bhutto in his hometown, Larkana. After these Larkana meetings, Bhutto took a belligerent stand against Sheikh Mujib

The All India Radio, Urdu Service, in its news bulletin at 07:00AM announced the ‘Fall of Dacca’ on December 16, 1971. Except a handful of people in West Pakistan, most in their knee-jerk reaction refused to buy the Indian “propaganda”. The Radio Pakistan was still busy playing Quami Taranay (patriotic anthems). However, the populace in West Pakistan was, before long, accepted the reality of surrender amidst empty theatrics of fighting on the western front.

The Pakistan military bureaucracy, no doubt, had bitten dust in East Pakistan. But it actually saved the West Pakistan from the Bengali rule even if the Bengalis had scored a legitimate claim to the power through democratic means. That was the game from the very beginning. Handing over the power to the democratically elected representatives was a defeat in Khaki lexicon. The loss of the majority province; the loss of life, or 90,000 POWs in Indian prisons did not amount to much.

The ‘Fall of Dacca’ had been initiated long before the watershed events in 1971. In fact, it began in 1947. The gravity of the situation was visible already during the war with India in 1965. The 1965 War changed many perceptions, shifted the paradigms, and re-configured the politics.

Though India did not take advantage of the situation and stayed away from East Pakistan yet the defenseless Bengalis and their leadership realized that the military establishment was only concerned with West Pakistan. In fact, Bengali leadership publicly questioned the rationale behind the war and disowned it. They could not see a reason to risk East Pakistanis’ lives to secure Kashmir. The resentment translated into the Six Points presented by Sheikh Mujib. The Six Point-agenda united the Bengalis for 1970’s general elections.

Sheikh Mujib, helped by nationalistic slogans and a natural disaster, swept the polls in East Pakistan. Bhutto gained majority in Sindh and Punjab. With two different parties claiming majority in two separate parts of the country, the stage was set for military establishment to violent-maneuver even when many political options were available.  However, maneuvering did not work. Hence, an ignominious military and political defeat. The defeat not only dismembered the country, it also buried the myth of the ‘two nation theory’, supposedly Pakistan was based on.

Arguably, the Six Point-agenda presented by Sheikh Mujib was a recipe for secession. His Six Points called for two currencies, two capitals, and two central banks. In essence, he was asking for two prime ministers, two presidents, and two armies. But presenting a program and implementing it are two different things. There’s many a slip ’twixt the cup and the lip. There were still strong pro-Pakistan currents among Bengalis. The Bengali middle class was disgusted with West Pakistan elite but it was not yet etched in stone that they were ready to break off.

However, the army concluded that if Mujib did not succeed the first time, he would eventually get an independent East Pakistan in the next round. That was the apparent cause of the Military action in East Pakistan.

A few days after the 1970 elections, Gen. Yahiya Khan along with some senior military generals visited Bhutto in his hometown, Larkana. After these Larkana meetings, Bhutto took a belligerent stand against Sheikh Mujib. Eventually he told the elected members to not attend the Constituent Assembly’s inaugural session. He threatened the members that those attending the sessions would have their legs broken. Within days, Gen. Yahiya Khan postponed the assembly session in Dacca causing a violent reaction there. It became clear to all that Bengalis would not be allowed to arrive at the helm of Islamabad.

Bhutto’s support for army was not a burst of emotions. It was a signal to the army that he would stick his neck out for army’s sake. It was also a signal to Sheikh Mujib who got his cue and there never were any serious negotiations with the army. The Awami League leadership escaped to India. Sheikh Mujib was the only leader arrested by the army.

The army used two-prong strategy to bring down the Bengali insurgency. First, it used violent attacks in the urban middle class areas including the Dacca University to break the will and intimidate the urban middle class, temporarily forcing them to stay away from the protest. Secondly, the army created a climate of extreme intimidation in rural areas when it forced millions of people to leave their homes. Peaceful Hindu minority was especially targeted and that started the exodus to the neighboring India. millions of refugees eventually drew India into the conflict. The final outcome had literally been penned by the military bureaucracy well before the actual surrender on December 16, 1971.