In some statements by the power elite, the threat from the Taliban was described as more serious than that posed by India. Frightened citizens began to discuss the Taliban scourge in their private circles
It is a political adage that the modern state is a juridical-territorial entity that does not tolerate competing centres of power and authority because to do that would mean a detraction from its exclusive claim to the legitimate use of force over its territory. Another adage is that dividing sovereignty would destroy it.
It is within the domestic sphere that states are normally able to assert their sovereignty, but capability varies considerably from state to state. Ethnically and religiously diverse post-colonial states find inherited ambiguous political arrangements between the former paramount colonial order and non-state actors such as native rulers, tribal chiefs and other petty local power-holders a vexatious problem. With the change from colonial to independent entities, the post-colonial states find the old arrangements generally obsolete. Agreeing to a new relationship is not always easy. Powerful non-state actors can challenge the authority of the state if their interests clash with that of the central authority. In a case where the post-colonial state itself has played some role in bolstering their strength, the clash of interest can become a serious challenge to its sovereignty.
Examined in this context, Pakistan’s travails with the Taliban constitute a syndrome of contested sovereignties generated by policies the state adopted during the Afghanistan civil war. A reign of terror prevailed in Afghanistan after the United States abandoned the former once the Soviet Union had been expelled from its territories. Alliances of warlords polarised into a Northern Alliance comprising mainly Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazaras and, on the other end, the predominantly Pushtun leaders of southern Afghanistan. The Taliban (literally students of religious schools known as madrassas), led by Mulla Omar, joined the gory contest much later, but surprisingly routed all others and captured the capital, Kabul, in 1996. Pakistan rejoiced over the victory of the Taliban because the vanquished Northern Alliance was backed by its archrival, India. Consequently, close relations were forged between the Taliban and the Pakistan military and the chief spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Initially, the Taliban regime was successful in establishing “law and order”, but soon afterwards, it began to impose an Islamic order that, by its extreme severity and brutality, outdid, by a wide margin, the repressive fundamentalist regimes of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Educated women became their favourite target – teachers, doctors and nurses were sent home. Female education was declared un-Islamic and no woman could step out of the four walls without a male escort. The Taliban fell from power after Al-Qaeda, consisting mainly of Arab and other foreign veterans of the Afghan jihad, masterminded terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. The United States attacked the Taliban regime. By November 2001, the Taliban had been expelled from Kabul. They dispersed, seeking sanctuary in the tribal belt along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. For some years, they maintained a low profile.
From 2005 onwards, they began to flex their muscle in areas under their control. At that time, a right-wing religious alliance, the Muthidda Majlis-Amal, (MMA), was in power in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where the tribal areas are located. The MMA imposed strict Sharia law and the Taliban provided the shock troopers to the Hasba force that was set up to extract compliance from the people to their medieval edicts. Typically, young girls were told to have male escorts when going to school. The Hasba goons raided the NWFP capital, Peshawar, several times, targeting shops selling entertainment materials such as music and film discs. Barbers were told not to shave the beards of their customers.
The Pakistani government had joined the war on terror immediately after the 9/11 attacks and helped the Americans apprehend Al- Qaeda operatives. However, with regards to the activities of the MMA and its Taliban allies, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf only expressed verbal condemnation. That only emboldened the Taliban to expand their activities. They began to help their counterparts in Afghanistan launch attacks on the United States-led forces. The Americans demanded action against them from Pakistan, and General Musharraf had to order security and military forces to go after the Taliban. The Americans also took part in those operations by firing missiles at Taliban enclaves in the tribal areas. In some of the attacks, noncombatants were also killed. It created considerable anger among the local people. Pakistani troops as well as the Taliban suffered hundreds of fatalities.
From 2007 onwards, Taliban leader, Baitullah Mehsud, intensified the campaign by dispatching suicide bombers to other parts of Pakistan. Suicide bombings became an almost daily occurrence and the national capital, Islamabad, the biggest city in the dominant Punjab province, Lahore, and important military towns such as Sargodha were visited by waves of suicide bombings. Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was reportedly killed by Mehsud’s men on 27 December 2007. During 2005-08, 7,997 fatalities and 9,670 injuries took place in Pakistan due to terrorism. The government succeeded in arresting 4,113 suspected terrorists. It was becoming increasingly evident that the Taliban were aiming to capture power in Pakistan and would especially draw full capital out of terrorism as the means to that end.
By 2007, the long arm of the Taliban reached Lahore. A number of attacks on the police, security and intelligence personnel and offices took place. Dozens of deaths and injuries were inflicted as a result. Traders and shopkeepers dealing with music and film compact discs and digital versatile discs were warned to get rid of their un-Islamic merchandise. An attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in the spring of 2009 increasingly exposed Pakistan’s vulnerability.
Such deadly activities could not have been sustained without the Taliban receiving some help and assistance from rogue elements within the state apparatuses. Pakistan’s existence as a polity upholding even nominal norms of civilised behaviour was being gravely undermined. Rumours were apace that the Taliban had established their presence in Punjab. Already extremist organisations such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, formally banned but not dismantled, were in Punjab. The security establishment began to dread an escalation of terrorism they may not be able to control.
Stakes continued to rise sharply as the Taliban declared, in late 2008, the establishment of
Islamic rule in the Swat Valley. More than 200 girl schools were blasted with bombs. In future, girls could at most attend school up to the 5th grade. Public amputations, floggings and stoning were carried out. In another part of NWFP, the Orakzai Agency, the Taliban demanded the Sikh minority to pay the polltax, jizya, or flee. Other minorities were issued similar threats. A reign of terror was unleashed. Hundreds of thousands of terrified and traumatized people headed for safe havens outside Swat. The media began to remind that the Taliban were less than 100 kilometres from Islamabad. The threat to Pakistan’s existence became palpable.
Since coming into power in March 2008, President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani have been issuing warnings that terrorism would not be tolerated. The Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, had already been issuing similar statements after he took office in November 2007. In some statements by the power elite, the threat from the Taliban was described as more serious than that posed by India. Frightened citizens began to discuss the Taliban scourge in their private circles.
Finally in the second week of May 2009, the military embarked upon an operation that declared the expulsion of the Taliban from Swat as its immediate objective but its extermination as the ultimate goal. In a few weeks, the Taliban were dislodged from the main towns of Swat Valley. The Pakistani military pursued them into their strongholds of South Waziristan. On 5 August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud was slain in a United States drone attack, which had been possible through intelligence-sharing between the United States and the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies. The threat of Talibanisation had been averted. However, it is by no means over.
As argued earlier, no state can tolerate rival centres of power and authority within its territory. The Taliban wanted to capture the state machinery and, from that vantage point, subjugate the larger society to their barbaric, totalitarian ideology. In one sense, the
Taliban wanted to complete the Islamisation of Pakistan that General Zia-ul-Haq had adopted in the late 1970s. However, it was never fully implemented. By and large, Pakistani politicians and civil society rejected such extremism and, ultimately, the Pakistan military also came out forcefully against it. As long as such a consensus exists in Pakistan, the Talibanisation of the state and society is not possible.
This piece first appeared in ‘South Asia’, ISAS (Institute of South Asian Studies), Issue 14, October, 2009. It has been posted on Viewpoint with author’s permission.
