Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force and a third of its army. Pakistan suffered most, with 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded while India lost 3,000 lives and 12,000 wounded.14000 square kilometers of land was captured by the Indian army on the Western front
In most of our narratives, the Eastern Theatre during the 1971 Indo-Pak war remains the focus of our attention. This is primarily due to the magnitude and complexity of war in the East and the far-reaching consequences it had on the geo-political developments in the region. However, little has been written and known on our side as to the conduct of war on the Western front.
Apart from political factors, the Pak Army generally puts the blame of its defeat in East Pakistan to large scale Indian involvement and the role Mukti Bahini played as a guerilla force supporting the invading Indian army. However, it would be enlightening as to how it performed in the Western Theatre of operations where Pakistan army existed as an integrated military force with no threat of any sabotage or clandestine acts of hostility by an invisible enemy.
In 1971, Pakistan had near parity with India in armor and artillery while the later had superiority in infantry.
The war began on Dec 3, 1971 when at 5.40 PM, 50 Pakistan Air Force aircraft launched a pre-emptive strike against 50 Indian airfields in North-Western India. That same day Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the immediate mobilization of troops and full-scale invasion of East Pakistan.
However, on the Western front the primary Indian objective remained preventing Pakistan from entering Indian soil with no intention to launch an offensive. The Indian military strategy was to remain on the defensive in the West until the Eastern Command achieved all its objectives.
On the contrary Pakistan army’s war plan centered on launching a counter-offensive with one armored and two infantry divisions on the Western front in case of Indian attack on East Pakistan. At what point in time would the attack be launched, however, remained undecided. On December 3, 1971 Pakistan’s 12 Div attacked Poonch but lack of surprise, poor quality of generalship by GOC Akbar Khan (a candidate for COAS in 1976), insufficient logistics and a determined Indian resistance led to the failure of the offensive and Pakistani troops had to withdraw. Though troops from 23 Div of the Pak Army, led by General Iftekhar Khan Janjua, entered Chhamb on December 9, 1971 yet on the same day the death of General Iftekhar in a helicopter crash hit by the Indian troops brought everything to a standstill. He was to be the only Pakistani general to have been killed in combat.
Pakistan’s Commander 1 corps, Lieutanent General Irshad Ahmad was an incompetent general, completely lacking vision and initiative. Hence, the firepower of two divisions under his command namely the 6 Armored Div and the 17 Infantry Division could never be effectively employed during the war. The strike formations remained idle in the rear during the entire course of the war.
Commander 8 Infantry Division, General Abdul Ali Malik, also proved to be a phenomenal failure. He hurled his units into battle without any planning and preparation. For instance, only in the battle of Basantar in Shakargarh area, 66 Pakistani tanks were destroyed and 20 captured by the Indians while India lost only 10.
In this battle two Indian officers 2nd Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal and Major Hoshiar Singh won the highest gallantry award, Param Vir Chakra while Lt. Colonel Mohammed Akram Raja of 35FF was awarded Hilal-e-Jurrat by the Pakistan Government on the basis of a citation written by Lieutenant Colonel, Ved Airy of the Indian army.
The plan to capture Longewala in the southern sector by 18 Infantry Division failed before it could even take off when armored unit spearheading the attack was neutralized by two Indian hunters as there was no air support available to the Pakistan ground forces. The Indian Army destroyed or captured 36 Pakistani tanks and 100 vehicles while 200 Pakistani soldiers were killed. India lost only two soldiers and a jeep mounted reconnaissance rifle. It is interesting to note that in the battle for Longewala, 120 Indian soldiers faced 2800 Pakistani troops and 65 tanks. The 1997 Indian film Border depicts the battle for Longewala.
The Indian navy attacked Karachi port on the night of 4th and 5th December 1971 and destroyed PNS Khaybar and Muhafiz while badly damaging PNS Shah Jahan. Later, Pakistan also lost the submarine PNS Ghazi. In all, two destroyers, one minesweeper, seven gunboats, three patrol vessels and one submarine were destroyed. Several Pakistani commercial ships were also sunk later while a large part of the reserve fuel tanks was dismantled. On the other hand one Indian frigate was sunk; Okha harbor was hit while several fuelling facilities were damaged.
In air war, Pakistan lost 72 aircraft against India’s 65. On the ground Pakistan suffered most, with 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded while India lost 3,000 lives and 12,000 wounded (both combatants and non- combatants). Similarly, 14000 square kilometers of land was captured by the Indian army, mostly in Pakistan administered Kashmir, the Punjab and Sindh.
Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force and a third of its army. The war also exposed the shortcomings of Pakistan's declared strategic doctrine that the “defense of East Pakistan lays in West Pakistan”. Moreover, the army failed to fulfill its promise of fighting to the last man. The Eastern Command had laid down arms after losing only 1,300 men in battle. In West Pakistan 1,200 military deaths had accompanied lackluster military performance. Phenomenal operational incompetence characterized Pakistan’s military leadership during the 14 day war with India.The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission report which was never made public concluded:
“There is a consensus on the imperative need of bringing to book senior army commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the constitution, usurpation of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional incompetence, culpable negligence and willful neglect in the performance of their duties and physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capabilities and resources to resist the enemy.”
A fine moral code of conduct is perhaps the strongest weapon a soldier is armed with; a weapon which he is expected to possess and display at all times. Today, the almost complete professional and moral collapse of our armed forces is the payoff of not implementing the recommendations of “The Commission” while notwithstanding the many opposing circumstances, our army and its “strategic assets” are on a fast-track to engage the sole super power and its European allies.
| Waseem Altaf is a social activist. |
