Nothing but tactical matter

Armed militias cannot be allowed to operate and hold territory. Unless the aim of the talks is to settle how armed rebellion is to be ended, they will get nowhere

‘The real issue is whether the state has a clear notion of what it is trying to achieve in this case and what its basic demands are?,’ asks Omar Ali in an interview with Viewpoint on the question of talks with Taliban. He is a Pakistani-American with an interest in history and particularly the history of Islam and Pakistan. He works as an academic physician and blog at Brownpundits.com in his spare time. He also write articles for 3quarksdaily.com and occasionally in other publications. Read on:

Should Pakistan government hold talks with Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

I think talks as a tactical matter are just that: a tactical matter. Parties involved in civil wars have talked to each other and fought each other and even cooperated with each other. The real issue is whether the state has a clear notion of what it is trying to achieve in this case and what its basic demands are? I think the Pakistani state does not inspire confidence on that account. The establishment appears to be divided and unclear about what it wants. And sections of the establishment (at a minimum) have an agenda that is closer to TTP than it is to any of the major parties that supposedly make up the government.

Suppose there are talks. What conditions would you suggest for such a dialogue?

As a general principle, one would expect any state to insist on a monopoly of violence. Armed militias cannot be allowed to operate and hold territory. Unless the aim of the talks is to settle how armed rebellion is to be ended, they will get nowhere.

How do you view the stand taken up by politicians like Imran Khan?

I think Imran Khan is a well meaning person, but he seems to sincerely believe various fairy tales that are really meant for schoolchildren (like the claim that terrorism came to Pakistan with 9-11, the golden ages past, the Scandinavian social democratic version of ‘rue Islam’, the ‘vision of Quaid-e-Azam and Iqbal’). This makes him susceptible to manipulation by sharp operatives who know how to use those visions to manipulate people. One can imagine a Mao or a Lenin using various tactical positions to advance a deeper strategic agenda, but in his case I don’t think he has a really coherent strategy. Given the kind of followers he has attracted, he is likely to be used by Pak nationalists or to be sabotaged by them. This sounds harsh, but I think it is likely.

There have been ‘peace deals’ between TTP and Pakistan army. How has been the past experience regarding such deals? Many commentators believe that TTP always exploited such deals to extend its influence. Your comments.

There is no question about the fact that those peace deals were all taken as signs of weakness and surrender by the TTP. Since the deal did not disarm them or return the area to Pakistani law (whatever that may be) they correctly assumed that their rule over area X had been legitimised. And since they know what they want, they wanted to go out and start "liberating" more areas. It may be that the last peace deal in Swat was really some sort of trick to expose the TTP and prepare the ground for an operation, but whatever the army's intentions, their media management is weaker than TTPs. Not because the army has less resources (they clearly have far more), but because the army does not have a coherent narrative and the TTP does.

How would the USA react to such talks? Also, when the USA is holding talks with Taliban, what moral authority does it has to oppose talks with Taliban in Pakistan [an objection often raised by Media Mujahideen]?

The US will do whatever the US feels is in its "interests", however defined by them. They tend to be arrogant and ignorant about the various peoples they are trying to rule/pacify/develop/whatever, so they make a lot of mistakes. But at least they have their own aims and they do X or Y because they happen to think that suits their aims. In any case, moral authority is a strange concept in this regard. The real issue is what is the aim and will this tactical decision help or hinder in achieving that aim? It is hard to see how peace talks based on recognition of TTP positions and without even a ceasefire from their side, can be considered a smart move? Unless they are part of some overall strategy and that strategy makes sense at least for the ruling elite in Pakistan, they are likely to be a disaster. No strategy that permits TTP to grow stronger is in the long term interest of the ruling elite, but they are internally divided and unclear about their own identity. That means peace talks are unlikely to help them (or the people of Pakistan).

Pak army has curiously been evasive on the issue of talks with Taliban following recent offer by TTP. What do you think is Pak army’s view on talks with Taliban?

I have no inside information but the impression that one gets is that they have no clear or coherent strategy. Some army person may know better.

If you oppose talks, what would you suggest as a solution to TTP menace?

I think the ruling elite in Pakistan should genuinely give up any notion of using Islamist terrorists to further any foreign policy aims. Then make this clear to their own population and stop making up more and more incoherent stories about RAW and MOSSAD to explain every setback. Then work on getting broad agreement among mainstream bourgeois parties to try and establish state authority over all parts of the state, making peace deals with those willing to peacefully work for their cause (whether Baloch or Sindhi or Islamist) and pursuing those using violence (whether TTP or LEJ or anyone else). But I must say all that sounds like a very tall order. It will probably be a long struggle. And then we will just be at square one, facing all the problems of other poor south Asian states (all of us are hovering below sub-saharan Africa in human development). The real work starts after that.